Opinion – ‘Smoke and mirrors’: The Secretary-General and Zimbabwe

[This is an extract from an article in The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies. Views expressed do not reflect the opinion of the editorial board.]

In November 2017, the one-time hero of Zimbabwe’s independence, Robert Mugabe, was toppled from power by a military coup d’état. The 93-year-old autocrat, whose 37-year grip on power had grown increasingly feeble, was replaced by his former Vice-President, Emmerson Mnangagwa. Zimbabwe’s dominant political force, ZANU-PF, retained power but many who took to the streets in celebration of Mugabe’s departure believed that change was possible, away from the corruption, political violence and mismanagement of the past. Mnangagwa, previously Mugabe’s feared enforcer, seemed to respond to this new mood, even declaring his government’s desire to return to Commonwealth membership.

Baroness Scotland, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, responded that she looked forward to Zimbabwe’s return ‘when the conditions are right’.Footnote1 A key requirement of membership has been that the applicant country could demonstrate its compliance with the Commonwealth Charter (adopted in 2012) and other iterations of the Commonwealth’s values and principles.Footnote2

The disputed elections of 2018, which seemingly confirmed ZANU-PF in power, were marred by post-election violence and prompted a more sober appreciation of the difficulties ahead. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe’s eventual return to the Commonwealth remained in Patricia Scotland’s ‘pending’ tray. In 2022, she initiated an informal assessment process by the Commonwealth Secretariat to evaluate Zimbabwe’s actions in meeting the requirements of membership. While Secretariat officials reported ‘significant progress’, it was clear that much would depend on the Commonwealth and international reaction to Zimbabwe’s 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. The EU, the US and, most telling of all, the South African Development Community (SADC) were critical, concluding that the electoral process had in key respects fallen short of a range of local, regional and international standards.Footnote3 Veteran Zimbabwean analyst, Professor Stephen Chan, who came to witness the elections, was deported on his arrival, with officials alleging that his mission was to train insurgents.Footnote4 Unusually for elections in a non-member county, a Commonwealth Observer Group (COG) was invited to witness the polls. While referring in its initial statement to many of the same issues as other international observers, the COG withheld its judgement on the integrity of the elections until its final report.Footnote5

Early in 2024, this report was understood to be in the Secretary-General’s office, following submission, and awaiting printing. At the end of April, there were indications that the SG wished to see changes. In June, a senior Secretariat official confirmed that ‘clarifications’ had been sought but that some in the group had resisted any changes and these were not pursued. The staff member nonetheless described the report as ‘positive’ and said it would be made public soon.Footnote6 By the time of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Samoa, in October, the report had been provided to member governments and the government of Zimbabwe but still not released publicly. The Report was finally posted on the Secretariat website on 6 November, only days before the SG’s deadline for the end of member country consultations on Zimbabwe’s readmittance.

Substance aside, the report’s treatment by the Secretariat was highly irregular. In 2018, Commonwealth Heads of Government approved revised guidelines for election observation. They stipulated: ‘The Final Report of the COG will be issued in a timely manner, initially to key national stakeholders and then made public’.Footnote7 Although members of the COG are appointed by the Secretary-General, they are ‘independent, including of the Secretariat’.Footnote8 That is especially so of their report.

While the public release of the COG report took over a year, it was sent to Commonwealth governments shortly before the Commonwealth summit, together with a second key document. This was the Secretary-General’s informal assessment of Zimbabwe’s application. This memorandum, in reviewing political developments and the human rights climate since the 2018 Zimbabwe elections, also refers to the COG report on the 2023 elections.

Both reports have a broadly similar view of the challenges facing Zimbabwe as it seeks to demonstrate its democratic credentials. These include electoral law reforms, the release of political prisoners, and legislation that seeks to restrict civil society and freedom of expression. Where they differ is in a starkly different judgement of the likelihood that the Zimbabwe government is prepared to address outstanding issues. Scotland, in presenting her recommendations, is optimistic: ‘Zimbabwe has made remarkable democratic progress since the political unrest of 2017… it has demonstrated political will to engage and willingness to address key political challenges’. She continues: ‘While Zimbabwe is still in the early stages of its democracy, and challenges remain… most of the core criteria have been sufficiently and broadly met’.Footnote9 The COG report, by contrast, strikes a much more sceptical note. In commending some of the positive aspects of the election, including a largely peaceful environment, it continues: ‘Yet the Group regrets there were a number of shortcomings with the process that call into question the credibility, transparency and inclusivity of the election. Unfortunately, there have been few legislative reforms in key areas, including on the registration of political parties, campaign finance, and the independence of ZEC. Furthermore, Zimbabwe passed new laws that negatively impacted journalistic freedoms and civic space’. Its conclusion is stark: ‘The government, unfortunately, has not demonstrated the level of commitment to democratic reform that its citizens hope for’.Footnote10

A second difference is apparent in gauging the degree of public support that exists within the country for Zimbabwe’s immediate return to membership. In accordance with the criteria laid down in the 2007 guidelines on membership, the assessment report asks whether the applicant country has demonstrated ‘that there is popular support within its citizenry for joining the Commonwealth’.. Patricia Scotland’s answer is unequivocal: ‘The Secretary-General’s three assessment missions to Zimbabwe have all reported widespread enthusiasm and consensus from all sectors and stakeholders that Zimbabwe should be readmitted to the Commonwealth’.Footnote11

Stuart Mole, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, London, UK. He is also a member of the Round Table editorial board.

Related articles:

House of Lords debate: The Commonwealth and Zimbabwe (January 2023)

Zimbabwe’s elections and the Commonwealth: The challenge of how to deal with ‘business as usual’

Opinion: Zimbabwe’s continued isolation

 Zimbabwe and election observation missions