The report of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions.
[This is an excerpt from an article in The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies. Views expressed do not reflect the position of the editorial board.]
The Hogue Inquiry issued an initial public report in May 2024 and a final report on 28 January 2025.Footnote1 It held weeks of public hearings and disclosed on its website a great deal of declassified government documentation.
In looking back on the period from 2018 to 2024 the Inquiry found that foreign interference campaigns had occurred, with the PRC and India being the leading threat actors. The Inquiry’s access to the intelligence holdings of the Canadian government led it to identity PRC interference in both the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, including by targeting individual electoral ridings with large Chinese diaspora communities and by engaging in disinformation campaigns meant to sway voters against support for parties and candidates with alleged anti-PRC views. India was believed to have engaged in clandestine attempts to provide financial support to preferred candidates during the 2021 election. The Inquiry also affirmed that these interference operations had had little to no impact on Canadian elections.
A crucial assessment was made, in response to a June 2024 review of foreign interference by NSICIOP that contained some alarming allegations about the activities of Parliamentarians, that there was no body of intelligence that indicated that Parliamentarians had acted in any conspiratorial way, had betrayed the Canadian interest, or had engaged in anything amounting to treason.
The final report of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference, in accordance with its mandate, looked forward, to assess the continuing threat and to make recommendations. Altogether the report contained 51 recommendations across a wide range of issues. But two messages were at its heart. One was the importance of better government transparency and public communications about foreign interference threats, to provide for societal resilience and ward off sensationalism. The Inquiry essentially suggested that the entire political firestorm caused by media reporting might have been avoided had proper transparency been exercised. The other main message was a cautionary note that the very nature of foreign interference was changing and shifting into the world of online disinformation campaigns. Justice Hogue called this the greatest threat to Canadian democracy in future and went so far as to deem it ‘existential’.
In her final report Justice Hogue indicated she hoped many of her recommendations could be implemented ‘promptly’. That hope has been challenged by the current state of Canadian federal politics, with the resignation of the Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, a Liberal party leadership contest to replace him, and the prorogation of Parliament. A federal election looms on 28 April 2025. An even greater challenge has been the all-consuming focus of attention on the need to respond to unprecedented threats from the new US President to impose crippling tariffs and even to seek the annexation of Canada. US actions in the early days of the Trump presidency have also raised concerns that the United States may join the list of foreign actors engaged in political interference against Canada.
What lessons might the Canadian experience with foreign interference campaigns and controversies have for other Commonwealth states. The list might include the following:
The importance of a government capacity to understand trends in foreign interference campaigns.
A strong intelligence capacity to ‘detect, deter and counter’ such campaigns.
An ability to monitor and publicly warn about foreign state disinformation campaigns.
Government transparency and good public communications about foreign interference.
Public-facing mechanisms to protect democratic elections.
Strong, independent review bodies to investigate foreign interference.
Above all, building a resilient society that is sufficiently knowledgeable about foreign interference campaigns and has the tools, including the media and education tools, to disarm them.
Foreign interference capacities have been dramatically boosted by new tools, such as artificial intelligence and deep fakes, that can magnify online information operations by malicious state actors and their proxies. The application of these new tools presents the leading edge of the threat posed by foreign interference. All Commonwealth countries will need to be able to monitor and try to control the harmful effects of these tools on democratic discourse and election processes.
Wesley Wark, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Waterloo, Canada.
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