
[This is an excerpt from an article in The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies. Views expressed do not reflect the position of the editorial board.]
A polarising figure at home and abroad, Modi has promoted India internationally as a growing world economy, open for investment, and as a leading member of international alliances such as the G-20 and BRICS. No longer does the country punch below its weight, which it did for decades. He has established strong (and heavily publicised) relationships with world leaders, especially but not only with Donald Trump during the first Trump presidency Such signs of importance boost Modi’s political image back in India and enable him to tie the widespread Hindu diaspora into his political fold.
Modi’s critics rarely acknowledge his plus points. Occasionally, however, there is recognition, as Ramachandra Guha, a historian and prominent social commentator, showed in a critical Foreign Affairs essay headed ‘India’s Feet of Clay’, published just before the 2024 election.
Although [Modi’s] economic record is mixed, he has still won the trust of many poor people by supplying food and cooking gas at highly subsidized rates via schemes branded as Modi’s personal gifts to them. He has taken quickly to digital technologies, which have enabled the direct provision of welfare and the reduction of intermediary corruption. He has also presided over substantial progress in infrastructure development, with spanking new highways and airports seen as evidence of a rising India on the march under Modi’s leadership.Footnote1
The key point here is that Modi has introduced far more effective initiatives for the poor than previous Congress governments, transforming the lives of hundreds of millions of Indians, especially in deprived areas with dramatically improved services. Low-income families have been provided with funds to build ‘pucca’ (permanent) homes to replace or extend traditional rural and slum dwellings. Modi’s Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India Mission) programme has improved sanitation by building tens of millions of toilets for the poor. There has also been provision of gas cylinders, electrical connections and more than 500 million bank accounts. Implementation of these schemes is far from perfect, and there have been many failures with corruption and poor delivery, but Modi is frequently credited for the innovations. On a broader front, there are the highways that Guha mentioned and a mass of other infrastructure schemes.
Modi-Trump starts well with White House talks in February
India’s BJP hangs on to power but loses overall control
The greatest political show on earth: India’s general election 2024
On the macro-economic level, there have been significant reforms since 2014, some of which had been initiated with less follow-through by previous Congress governments. Regulations for big business have been dramatically eased (but not sufficiently to meet what is needed to drive sustained growth); India is now regarded internationally as a desirable investment location, just as companies are seeking alternatives to China. Corruption, however, is still rife at all levels throughout India, despite Modi’s repeated claims to the contrary, and the government’s appetite for reforms seems to have faded after the 2024 general election that drastically reduced the number of the BJP’s parliamentary seats.
Hindu nationalism
The country, with its young and aspirational population, may well be ready for a nationalist approach. There is a sense of Modi having restored a feeling of self-worth to Indian middle and upper classes while remaining a paternal figure for the poor, providing national stability at a time of traumatic change in most neighbouring countries. Arguably, however, that nationalism and re-injection of national pride do not need to go to the current authoritarian extremes of Hindu majoritarianism, where Muslims and other minorities (including Christians in some areas) feel persecuted and vulnerable second-class citizens. This is worse in BJP-controlled states such as Uttar Pradesh but is far less evident in southern states.
The Hindu nationalist (Hindutva) doctrine stems from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), an umbrella organisation that embraces the BJP and promotes extreme views on India being a Hindu nation. Modi’s implementation has sometimes been harsher on Muslims than even the RSS would like. Mohan Bhagwat, the RSS’s leader, has indicated this and has also implicitly criticised Modi for his egocentric behaviour, using the word ‘ahankara’ (arrogance).Footnote2 That was after Modi combined religion with politics to boost his image as a supreme leader, casting himself ostentatiously in the virtual role of a Hindu priest at the opening of a major temple at Ayodhya in north India on the site of a former mosque.
Some observers thought Modi would tone down the Hindutva focus after last year’s general election result, which drove him into an active coalition with other parties that might have wanted a less controversial approach. Instead, after a pause, the BJP has increased the majoritarian rhetoric, as was evident in the Maharashtra and Jharkhand state assembly election campaigns later in 2024. In Maharashtra, there was a rallying cry: ‘if you are divided, you will be killed’, which was seen as a call to militant Hinduism.
Attacks on mosques have continued, and there are confrontational calls for Hindu authorities to reclaim sites now occupied by mosques, following the example of Ayodhya. A controversial citizenship law that offers amnesty to non-Muslim illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries has already been enacted. BJP-controlled state governments, including Assam and Uttarakhand, have begun introducing their own Uniform Civil Codes that outlaw Islamic and other personal laws, and the BJP has said it plans to extend this elsewhere.Footnote3
But there is no movement yet on an even more confrontational National Register of Citizens that could make Muslims and other minorities prone to discrimination and threats of major constitutional changes seem to have receded.
Like Donald Trump in the US, Modi’s populist aim has been to ‘clean the swamp’. The aim is to enforce Modi’s supremacy while entrenching the Hindu doctrine and establishing a new elite. Political dominance has been partly secured institutionally by appointing supportive and malleable top bureaucrats to the Election Commission of India, while sidelining those who do not fall into line. This has been done to a much greater extent than under previous governments. It has ensured favourable timings of elections and flexible administration of regulations, although there appears to be no evidence that this has seriously affected polling results.
John Elliott is a foreign correspondent, formerly in India, for the Financial Times, and The Economist. He is also a member of the Round Table editorial board.